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Once through the
Wonderland of Logic,
and Back Again
by Harriet E. Lulie

Modern civilization is experiencing the
early tremors of a technological revolution which will confuse and unsettle society as it forces the reexamination of
those values which form the bedrock of
our civilization's world view. We as a society will soon, as history measures time,
bring the vital processes of biology under
human control as thoroughly as we have

domesticated mechanical devices. History bears the record of what struggles
individuals and societies had to endure
to develop a modus vivendi which allowed man to survive the industrial revolution. Law was called upon to resolve
many issues between individual litigants,
many of which necessarily involved
value judgments about ideologies and

philosophies of life.
The development of product liability
law is often quoted as an area where the
balance in favor of manufacturers has
been slowly tipping in favor of the ultimate consumer. The legal system has
only grudgingly admitted its growing role
as arbitrator between competing lifestyles. The law has been and will be re-

quired to evaluate the permissibility of
actions taken by individuals who have
embraced the new technological possibilities. These new alternatives will
allow the development of life styles
which were physically impossible before
science gave man the capability to make
choices in structuring the fundamental
organization of life processes. This capability is limited at the moment to the relatively simple procedures such as abortion, euthanasia, and some organ transplants. However, there is no reason to
believe that the technological revolution
is losing momentum or that future development will not perfect a more complete guidance of life systems.
The burden of resolving conflicts between individual litigants necessarily falls
upon the courts. The procedure, the
very habits of rational thought, by which
the courts organize this flood of new information and adapt to the new focus on
life will in part determine with what measure of respect society will regard its legal
system. The courts have an opportunity
to reevaluate their values - indeed
those of society - in order to help society deal with its growing pains in as calm
an atmosphere as possible.
The methods by which courts dealt
with conflicts between life styles in Victorian and earlier times were laden with
presuppositions and attitudes which are
no longer acceptable. The traditional
rationalizations were so deeply rooted
that a member of the Supreme Court
was able to proclaim: "The constitution
of the family organization, which is
founded on divine ordinance, as well as
the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood .... This is the law of the
Creator." Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).
Modern life has placed a great deal of
practical emphasis on protecting individual worth and freedom of choice.
When social values conflict, there must
be a forum available which will structure
the debate in a responsible manner and
focus the issues. A distinguished modern
jurist, Edward H. Levi, Attorney General
of the United States, has addressed the
need:

In a broadly based, vocal and literate
society, susceptible to the persuasion
of many tongues and pens, and with
inadequate structuring of relevant debate the Court has a useful function
not only in staying time for sober second thought but in focusing issues. It is
sometimes the only forum in which issues can be sharply focused or appear
to be so. E. LEVI, THE NATURE OF JuDICIAL REASONING, LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY (Sidney Hooked. 1964),
as reprinted in JURISPRUDENCE 967-77
(G. Christie ed. 1973).
The legal system is called upon to arbitrate when the existing authority of the
state enforces a certain standard of behavior which is the subject of reevaluation by a su bstantial cross section of contemporary thought. The usefulness of
habits of thought, generally lumped
under the label of stare decisis, does not
extend to this area, which arbitrates between opposing philosophies. Stare decisis can preserve what the law was, but
is insensitive to what is, should be, or will
be. Thus, another formula for a rational
process is needed to replace the discredited, formalistic thought process which
underlay the classic approach. The formal approach of classical philosophy
and its use of syllogistic reasoning from
first or necessary principles is too rigid,
too idealistic an approach for a pragmatic system of courts and procedure.
A judicial branch of government must
relate to the people as a living part of society's experience; it must be perceived
as a source of useful and appropriate
solutions. The Supreme Court has dealt
with opposing philosophies in the past
and has acknowledged the complexity
and magnitude of the task: "We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the
sensitive and emotional nature of the
abortion controversy, of the vigorous
opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
116 (1973).
A closer look at two of the "vigorous
opposing views" would deepen the understanding of the nature of the beast
that the courts have been tasked to
tame. The natural law tradition, whether
in its classic formulation by Thomas
Aquinas or utilitarian approach of
Jeremy Bentham, was chosen as gener-

l'

ally familiar to students of philosophy.
Furthermore, both of these ethical
theories have exerted a strong shaping
influence on modern thought and the
literary traditions in which judges function. A system of comparison is more interesting when the subjects are sufficiently dissimilar so that any areas of
agreement appear all the more startling.
Both of the theories chosen are objective
in the sense that they accept the existence of independent standards which
make it possible to determine which actions are necessary and appropriate if
people are in fact to do what they ought
to do.
Jeremy Bentham gave this: "[F]undam ental axiom, it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the
measure of right and wrong ... " J.
Bentham, A Fragment on Government,
reprinted in A BENTHAM READER 45
(M. Macked. 1969), (hereinafter cited as
BENTHAM). Is [the Greatest Happiness
Principle] susceptible of any direct
proof? It should seem not: for that which
is used to prove everything else, cannot
itself be proved: a chain of proofs must
have its commencement somewhere.
To give such proof is as impossible as it is
needless. [d. at 87.
Thomas Aquinas posited that "[t]he
extrinsic principle moving to good is
God, who both instructs us by means of
His Law, and assists us by His
Grace .... " T. Aquinas, The Summa
Theologica, reprinted in JURISPRUDENCE 89 (G. Christie ed. 1973)
(hereinafter cited as AQUINAS).
These standards are seen as selfevident truths and free from personal
feelings, opinions, or prejudices.
"Systems which attempt to question it
[the principle of utility J, deal in sounds
instead of sense, in caprice instead of
reason, in darkness instead of light."
BENTHAM, supra at 85.
"[S]ince the speculative reason is
busied chiefly with necessary things,
which cannot be otherwise than they
are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail." AQUINAS, supra at 112.
While they agree to this point, they differ strongly on the content of the standards by which the detailed application
of moral judgments are to be made.

Thomas Aquinas and Jeremy
Bentham both agreed that man understands the principles of law directly from
its source.
Nature has placed mankind under the
governance of two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone
to point out what we ought to do, as
well as determine what we shall
do .... The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it
for the foundation of that system, the
object of which is to rear the fabric of
felicity by the hands of reason and of
law. BENTHAM, supra at 85.
The natural law is promulgated by the
very fact that God instilled it into
man's mind so as to be known by him
naturally. AQUINAS, supra at 94.
They also agree that the will plays a
part in the rational workings of a systematic body of law, but sharply disagree
as to the nature of that participation.
There is, or rather there ought to be, a
logic of the will. as well as of the understanding. .. Aristotle saw only the
latter. ... Yet so far as a difference can
be assigned between two branches so
intimately connected ... is in favor of
the logic of the will; since it is only by
this faculty, that the operations of the
understanding are of any consequence. BENTHAM, supra at 84.
Reason has its power of moving from
the will ... for it is due to the fact that
one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things
ordained to the end. But in order that
the volition of what is commanded
may have the nature of law, it needs to
be in accord with some rule of reason.
AQUINAS, supra at 91.
The basic moral principles of both systems operate in much the same way as
mathematical and logical principles. The
philosopher deduces the correct answer
in the particular case from the general
principles. Such a classical approach
would not normally be cause for comment. However. in examining the use of
such methods in the legal system, it is
significant that neither of these
philosophers hesitated to apply such
principles of logic to the practical workings of judicial systems. Law is identified
with logic in general and with such deductions as are found in accordance with
the principles of logic. Such deductions
are then considered necessary and not
merely contingent truths.

Of this logic of the will, the science of
law ... is the most considerable
branch ... It is, to the art of legislation,
what the science of anatomy is to the
art of medicine: with this difference,
that Logic is what the artist has to work
with, instead of being what he has to
operate upon . ... [T]ruths that form
the basis of political and moral science
are ... to be discovered by investigations as severe as mathematical ones,
and beyond all comparison more intricate and extensive. BENTHAM,
supra at 84-85.
As regards the general principles of
speculative or of practical reason,
truth or recititude is the same for all,
and is equally known by all .... Consequently we must say that the natural
law, as to general principle, is the
same for all ... AQUINAS, supra at
112.

That private ethics and generallegislation are ruled by the same considerations and principles is integral to both of
these theories. The principle or purpose
of law is universal happiness, as well as
individual happiness. At the same time,
laws are not mere definitions of abstract
principles, but describe the real nature of
actual experiences.
Now private ethics has happiness for
its end: and legislation can have no
other. Private ethics concerns every
member of society ... and legislation
can concern no more. BENTHAM,
supra at 136.
Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last
end of human life is bliss or happiness,
[T]he law must needs regards
principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover ... since one man is a
part of the perfect community, the
state, the law must needs regard
properly the relationship to universal
happiness." AQUINAS, supra at 92.
These two brilliant minds came so
close, yet in the end one can no more
hope for a final reconciliation between
them than expect two highly charged
particles of opposite polarization to bond
without loss of identity or energy. However faScinating such theories are, practical decisions must still be made under
the pressures of the adversary system.
The American legal system thrives on
the rough and tumble clash of opposing
theories vigorously pressed by talented
adversaries. Those systems with greater
organizational and theoretical precision
do not seem to offer in practice any dra-

matic improvements over our system of
individual action and diffused authority.
Indeed, could an amalgam of peoples
and attitudes which prides itself that
power flows from the roots (the people)
to the instrument of that power (the government) tolerate a legal system whose
basic thought processes and prejudices
lie in the opposite direction? That is to
say, can formal systems of philosophy,
which demand stern allegiance to the
first principles of social organization,
such as were briefly explored above,
successfully relate to a people whose
only fundamental, unchangeable and
necessary principle of official social organization is that no such principle can
ever be allowed to exist? Mr. Justice
Douglas' answer would clearly be a firm
"no" if his opinion in Roe v. Wade,
supra, is to be be believed.
Modern commentators generally
agree that the law exerts a strong influence on the patterns of relationships individuals experience as members of
groups. See generally, JURISPRUDENCE, ch. 4, at 51 (American Legal
Realism) (G. Christie ed. 1973). The impact of the civil rights cases emphasizes
the broad area of impact legal reasoning
can have on personal relationships. The
formalistic approach is evident in the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883),
wherein Mr. Justice Bradley divided
classifications of rights into logical, formalistic categories and then drew the
conclusions made obvious from the nature of the logical construct. The majority
opinion rested "upon grounds entirely
too narrow and artificial ... [T]he substance and spirit of the Civil Rights
Amendments have been sacrificed by
subtle and ingenious verbal criticism
... " Id. (Harlan, J., Dissenting) The logical deduction of conclusions from principles used by the majority did not save it
from the pressures for reform which
arose from the very nature of our pluralistic society.
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 US. 241 (1968), was a de
facto escape from the rigidity that the
formalistic reasoning of the earlier Court
had enshrined through the principle of
stare decisis. The facts of the case were
fundamentally on point; both involved
blacks who were systematically

excluded from public accomodations.
The earlier Civil Rights Cases, supra,
turned on strictly construed principles of
public power and private rights, the latter
case sketching in the broad outlines of
governmental power under the Commerce Clause without apology or overelaboration. The basic policy considerations were allowed to speak in their own
loosely termed language of social concern and probable consequences. The
significance of the comparison is that the
steady pressure from a pluralistic society's expectations broke judicial reasoning from its mold and brought it into
closer harmony with principles that have
often been ridiculed, but never abandoned. The essence of those principles
holds that government, in any of its
forms, should not attempt to fix the
scales between competing life styles and
personal evaluations of a proper social
order. The modern Court restated its
commitment to this policy decision,
which grew from the philosophy of our
revolution, inRoth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476(1957), the so-called "obsenity
case".

All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importanceunorthodox ideas, controversial
ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the
full protection of the guarantees, [of
the Constitution] unless excludable
because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.
[d. at 484.
The old Court of Justice Bradley ignored its duties as an agent for the calm
analysis and balancing of conflicting
interests which arise as a result of
change. The Court should not sanction
certain life styles, but it does have the
duty to encourage as fair a competition
as possible. Similarly. the old Court followed the stern dictates and condemned
society to endure the pains and dangers
of a breach birth of full citizenship for
blacks.
The Court cannot escape its power as
a force in society and should not be allowed to abdicate its duties by falling
back on the seductive and deceptive security of the classical paradise of syllogiStic logic and demonstration. If the simple
approach of deductive logic. i.e., a one
dimensional pattern of development, is

not acceptable, must society then wholly
depend on the inaccessible hunches of
individual judges? Some commentators
would cheerfully answer "in many
cases, yes" and pass on to the next subject. See generally Hutcheson, 14
CORNELLLAWQ. 2, 74(1929), reprinted
in JURISPRUDENCE 683 (G. Christie
ed. 1973). However, those who want a
bit more would probably conclude that
what is needed is a pragmatic approach
which would allow reason to be applied
under conditions of rapid flux and where
final answers are not available.
The modern world would be wise to
reevaluate its policy choices and search
for new inSights to gUide the priorities we
set for the use of our new powers over
life processes. What is needed is a tool of
thought which would be useful in private
decision making and judicial analysis of
private decisions. It would appear that in
order to free our thoughts from the webs
of the old approach it may be profitable
to reexamine a few truly ancient
thoughts. They at least will have the advantage of bringing a little sorely needed
perspective into the heated arguments
over where mankind should take life
from here, if indeed we should take it
anywhere at all.
The old approach of the Court to social issues has been qUietly scrapped and
a new vehicle for thought is slowly
maturing in its place. A brief look at our
common cultural heritage may help
bring the shape of things to come into
focus.
Aristole's pragmatic approach to the
task of applying reason in situations
where knowledge is unavailable is singularly adaptable to the judicial system.
See generally, Aristotle, THE TOPICS,
THE OXFORD TRANSLATION OF
ARISTOTLE (W.D. Ross ed. 1928), reprin~d inJUR~PRUDENCE839 (G
Christie ed. 1973) (hereinafter cited as
ARISTOTLE). Practical reasoning deals
with matters which are not proven in an
absolute sense, but which are shown to
be the most probable means of chosing
the better solution from those available.
The types of problems the dialectic
may deal with are those which demand
practical answers based upon considerations which are probable and may be
acted upon by a reasonable person. The

dialectical approach is useful when
people are involved as members of
groups which desire to use reason as part
of the decision making process. Aristotle
specifies that in areas where groups of
society are in conflict and there are convincing arguments for both sides, the
dialectical approach of searching for the
problem is especially suitable.
The modern Court, as noted above,
no longer relies upon formal logic to justify its conclusions as Justice Bradley did
when he was "forced to the conclusion"
that simple logic was responsible for
voiding an Act of Congress and not the
Court's social prejudices. Civil Rights
Cases, supra. Again, the more realistic
approach of the modern Court recognizes that judges are persuaded to answers, not forced into them by some artificial and rigid system of didactic logic.
An analysis based on the probable is as
reasoned as one derived from necessary
truths and has a greater chance of allowing "people of fundamentally differing
views" to share a constitution. See
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). There is
no need for the modem Court to hold to
the position that logic forces final conclusions which must be valid for all time in
order to uphold the judicial duty of rendering judgment from reasoned argument. However, an approach which will
allow consensus must, as does the
dialectic, avoid reliance on principles arrived at by closed systems of logic dependent on prior assumptions about the
nature of truth. ARISTOTLE, supra at 841.
A judicial system which hopes to have
a respectable future must keep in touch
with its society, no matter how difficult
and painful that process may be at times.
As our society is forced to an ever
stronger realization of the dynamic force
of science, its basic principle, the scientific method, will color every aspect of
our society and indeed of the world
civilization. The influence of the scientific
method is already being felt by legal
scholars:
In this approach to legal reasoning,
the scientific method, a conclusion is
accepted as plausible not because of
any intrinsic characteristics, but because its justification conforms to certain accepted standards for evaluating

empirically given legal materials. In
law as in science we proceed by using
a previously agreed upon method of
arriving at the conclusions on the basis
of the evidence available. G. Christie,
Still Another Model of Legal Argument. 78 YALE L.J. 1311 (1969), reprinted in JURISPRUDENCE 1005-16
(G. Christie ed. 1973).
In the emerging climate of general
opinion and legal thought any legal
analysis which is not subject to challenge
through experience and newly discovered facts will be unacceptable. The
dialectical approach shares many
characteristics with the scientific method;
they are both processes which help to
predict future probable occurrence on
the basis of what has been shown to
have occurred, or probably occurred, in
the past. But every process must eventually find a subject, and the subject of
the law is often a dark cave.
The projected object of the law when
it must, as a process, deal with the subject of man's control over life, is a corner
of that dark cave. Life is itself a process
which has never followed any logic, but
rather its own continuously evolving
process. No one has ever succeeded in
proving to the general satisfaction of
philosophers or mankind that life in the
raw has any purpose beyond existence

and reproduction. Thus any purpose
we, as humans, find in life must be based
on our experiences and policies. It would
then be fair to say that the purpose of
humanity is best stated in terms of
policies, such as the policy which favors
individual development and choice.
The Anglo-American system of jurisprudence has taken as one of its fundamental policies that judges are not competent to unilaterally declare facts which
are not accepted as such by those experts in the best postion to verify them as
probable. See Roe v. Wade, supra.
Therefore, in those areas where objectively accepted facts are not available,
the courts must fall back on the general
policy considerations as a basis for decision. Their refusal to speculate as to the
proper answer to the question of when
life begins was in accordance with the
modern developments of the role of the
judiciary. As the Supreme Court noted,
when those experts trained to arrive at
the most probable answer in a field of
knowledge cannot do so, the Court must
not presume to create facts from the thin
fabric of deductive logic and first principles. As there does not appear to be a
reasonably probable factual basis on
which to judge the nature of life itself, the

Court must restrict itself to an examination of the concept of life. However, the
Court is restricted in its power to interfere
with an individual's right to relate to concepts and will only invoke the governmental sanctions when that government or society is itself seriously threatened. It would be a strange argument to
say that where the nature of a concept,
such as life, holds so many unexplored
possibilities that the Court should have
the right or the power to judge them in
advance. The Court should not prohibit
personal initiative where there is no direct threat to those human lives as proven to exist to the satisfaction of those
competent to make such a finding, the
same scientists and doctors who have
given us such control over that life.
Therefore, the judicial system will not
be avoiding the issues if it performs the
valuable function of providing a forum in
which the experts can come before the
general audience of society and account
for their actions in terms of fact and not
social prejudice. The courts will have the
opportunity to help society sort through
the maze of scientific jargon, sift out
those facts helpful in weighing our
choices, and decide which alternatives
will improve the quality of life for all.

